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Multi-Level Governance in the EU and EU Democracy: Democratic 
Legitimacy, Democratic Accountability and Transparency of the 
European Offices of the English Local Authorities in Brussels  
 




This paper seeks to examine the role and functions of the representative 
offices of English local authorities in Brussels by considering the 
democratic legitimacy (i.e. linkage to elected councillors or mayors), 
accountability and transparency of the office’s activities. Representatives 
of each of the offices studied were interviewed by the authors and an 
examination of documents relating to the governance of the offices was 
also undertaken, resulting in a substantial amount of new data on the 
activities of the offices. The study demonstrates that the offices differ in 
their governance arrangements and funding, which has a direct impact 
on the approach to democratic legitimacy and accountability, noting that 
those offices which rely most heavily on direct funding from a single 
authority or a combined authority have the closest links to the authorities 
concerned. The transparency of the offices varies considerably, with 
clear distinctions between offices that are creatures of contract (i.e. 
where authorities have contracted out the activities of the office) or 
where offices are an emanation of the authority concerned and are thus 
in the public sector. The pattern here is less dependent on the pattern of 
funding of the office and depends more on the availability of resources 
and the approach adopted by the office itself. The article presents a 
substantial amount of new data on the activities of the offices and their 
approaches to legitimacy, accountability and transparency. It also seeks 
to demonstrate that the offices are increasingly important in tying 
together the territorial and functional interests in a locality in order to 
represent them at the European level. 
 
(A) Introduction  
 
(i) Aim of the study 
  
The aim of this article is to evaluate the democratic legitimacy, democratic 
accountability and transparency of the European offices of English local 
authorities, particularly in relation to the lobbying activity they carry out in 
Brussels. We would like to answer a fundamental question – to what 
extent is an office a loyal projection of the local community on the EU level, 
i.e. to what extent is the office linking effectively the people in the 
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jurisdiction of the local authority concerned with EU law-making and 
policymaking? 
 
First, this research will evaluate the democratic legitimacy and democratic 
accountability of the offices. By democratic legitimacy we mean that the 
fundamental decisions of the offices concerning the identification of their 
strategic goals and lobbying priorities shall derive, directly or indirectly, 
from the people or their representatives. By democratic accountability we 
mean that the offices shall be held accountable by bodies comprised of 
democratically elected representatives in relation to their action on the EU 
level.  
 
Second, the paper will consider the transparency of the offices. 
Transparency is key in a democratic setting. Only if the offices 
communicate effectively with the councils and inform the public effectively 
about their activity, the people and their elected representatives will be 
able to understand the work of the offices and make the most of their 
services. Also, transparency is essential to the accountability of the 
offices. Without information on their work, it would be impossible to assess 
the performance of the offices in a meaningful way.  
 
We have found that the approach to the selection of priorities for the 
offices varies significantly. We found no examples of direct consultation 
of citizens on the offices’ policy priorities. Greater Manchester is an 
example of consultation of stakeholders. There are offices which feature 
a stronger involvement of the elected councillors in their governance 
(East of England, Cornwall), however most offices are executive-led in 
that their direction is determined by the Mayor’s Office (London), or by 
the leaders of the local authorities concerned (Liverpool City Region). 
Due to the technicality of many EU-related matters, a key role is played 
by offices and services within the local authorities (this is particularly 
evident in relation to the European and International Service within 
Bristol City Council, but also within Cornwall Authority there are a 
number of teams that are involved in economic development and that 
contribute regularly to the direction of the Office). A number of offices 
(Bristol, Southern England, Liverpool) engage in regular communication 
with local stakeholders. However, this two-way dialogue is between the 
Office and certain stakeholders (universities, business organisations) 
and not with the larger community, ‘the public’.  
 
The input of local councils into the accountability of the offices varies. 
Some offices have accountability mechanisms involving the councils 
(particularly East of England and Cornwall). However, it should not be 
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forgotten that the councils may exercise some power on the offices via 
their general budgetary power. This power is stronger where a single 
authority provides the entire funding for the office (for example, Bristol), 
than in settings in which each individual authority only contributes a 
small amount to the overall budget of the office (for example, East of 
England or Southern England). EU issues are often reported only to the 
leaders of the borough councils and to senior officials and these issues 
are not usually discussed within the councils. Two-way communication is 
largely absent. This is not necessarily due to the approach taken by an 
office, but to the lack of adequate expertise and resources within the 
councils and possibly also to the lack of interest in the EU by some local 
councillors.  
 
Most offices do not engage in public consultations. It is clear that some 
offices do not undertake wider public consultation because they do not 
have the resources to do so. Others felt that aggregation of public 
opinion was a job for elected representatives and those who work in the 
offices, as local government officials, ought not to be involved in such 
activities. 
 
The offices make a wide-ranging use of websites and social media to 
publicize their work and to inform the public about relevant policy 
developments taking place in Brussels. An issue that some of the offices 
are facing is the limited resources and staffing for maintaining or 
regularly updating a website or operating a newsletter. The offices often 
interact with a very small portion of the community and this limitation 
certainly impairs their ability to represent the wider community effectively 
on the EU level.  
 
The offices state that they will disclose any non-confidential information 
upon request from members of the public. Due to their limited staff and 
resources, though, they might struggle to accommodate more than a 
very small number of requests. All the offices and the local authorities 
that they represent are subject to the FOIA.  
 
 
(ii) Scope and methodology 
 
This research covers 10 of the 13 currently operational European offices 
of the English local authorities: Access Europe Network (London); Bristol 
City Council; City of London; Cornwall Authority; East of England Local 
Partnership; Liverpool City Region; Local Government Association (LGA); 
London (Greater London Authority); New Economy Manchester (Greater 
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Manchester); Southern England Local Partners. Greater Birmingham and 
West Midlands Brussels Office, Kent Brussels Office and 
Northamptonshire County Council Brussels Office – which is currently 
being restructured – could not be covered. As the work of the City of 
London office and Access Europe Network (London) is not directly 
comparable to that of the other offices we have studied, we do not address 
them in detail here, though we seek to draw upon points of particular 
relevance raised in the interviews. 
 
We chose to limit the focus of the article to the English local authorities 
and not to include the offices of the devolved administrations which abide 
by different constitutional rules and occupy a different space in the 
constitutional structure.  
 
In carrying out this research, the authors have undertaken semi-
structured interviews, some in person and some by Skype or telephone 
with the directors or other relevant representatives of the offices 
concerned. Details of the key features of offices whose staff have been 
interviewed can be found in the tables in the online appendix. Each 
interview was semi-structured and guided by a set of questions 
generated by the authors in advance. The questions covered all the 
previously indicated themes (democratic legitimacy, accountability and 
transparency). 
 
(iii) Contribution to the Literature 
 
Despite the abundance of studies analysing the activity, organisation 
and impact of regional offices in Brussels, this is the first study dealing 
specifically with the question of the democratic legitimacy, accountability 
and transparency of the English offices. Rowe devotes a chapter of her 
book on the regional offices to their accountability. However, its focus is 
essentially limited to the ‘constitutional regions’, such as, the German 
Länder and the devolved administrations in the UK. She does not 
examine the European offices of English local authorities. In relation to 
the ‘administrative regions’, a group that clearly includes these 
authorities, she observes that there is a deficit of political control of the 
offices by elected governmental bodies within the region (Rowe 2011, 
205-206).  
Greenwood’s 2011 article on the regional offices applies the principal-
agent theory to the activity of the offices. He comes to the conclusion 
that offices of ‘highly devolved’ regions (such as the German Länder and 
the Spanish Autonomous Communities) tend to be the longa manus of 
the regional government and to be mere ‘delegates’ of the regional 
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government. Those of ‘medium devolved’ regions (such as the English 
local authorities) tend to have more autonomy and to develop their 
independent European agenda (i.e. they tend to be ‘agents’ rather than 
‘delegates’), in this way connecting the EU more effectively to wider civil 
society (Greenwood, 2011, 2014). The evidence offered by Greenwood 
in support of the larger autonomy of the offices of the medium devolved 
regions is essentially the wider range of policy areas they cover, 
compared to the highly devolved regions. However, a broader agenda, 
per se, does not necessarily mean that the interests of the local 
community are more democratically and effectively represented by the 
office. Moreover, it would appear that in Greenwood’s analysis ‘civil 
society’ is something different from what we would describe as ‘local 
community’. Whilst the latter would include all the members of the 
community, civil society might reflect a smaller portion of the community; 
i.e., that portion whose interests are effectively organised and 
represented by associations or other organisations.  
Overall, the body of literature on the European offices of the English 
local authorities is rather small and does not deal with our research 
question (John 1994, Macneill, Jeffery and Gibney 2007, Sykes and 
Lord 2011).  
 
(iv) Wider theoretical framework and added value of this research 
 
This study is relevant not only to UK public law, but also to the wider 
debate on multi-level governance (hereafter MLG) and democracy in the 
EU. At a very general level, MLG indicates the dispersion of authoritative 
decision-making across multiple players at different territorial levels 
within the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2001, xi). It also indicates the 
participation of sub-national players and their impact on EU 
policymaking (Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996, 356-69; Hooghe and 
Marks 2001, 12-24). This situation has led scholars to investigate more 
closely the relationship between MLG and democratic legitimacy (for 
example, Piattoni 2009, chapter 11; Benz 2010, 223-25) and particularly 
the contribution of local and regional authorities to democracy in the EU 
(Pernice 2002, 11; Cygan 2013; Panara 2015 and 2016). 
There are at least two streams of research in relation to this aspect. One 
focuses on the role of national and sub-national parliaments and 
democratically elected assemblies in the EU (Abels and Eppler 2011 
and 2015). The second is a wider approach that takes into account a 
number of policymaking avenues, including less structured channels, 
such as lobbying, and particularly the activity of the European offices of 
the sub-national authorities. This study is situated within this second 
stream and focuses on the European offices and their role. 
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There is a strong suggestion emerging from political documents of EU 
institutions and bodies (Commission’s White Paper on European 
Governance of 2001; Committee of the Regions’ White Paper on 
Multilevel Governance of 2009; European Parliament resolution of 14 
January 2003 on the role of regional and local authorities in European 
integration, point 4), as well as from academic literature (Greenwood 
2011; Mangiameli 2006, 460-462 and 475-476; Panara 2015, 173 and 
2016), that the involvement of local and regional authorities in the EU 
decision-making could improve the democratic quality of EU 
policymaking. In contrast, the views of a number of other scholars are 
quite pessimistic in this regard (Peters and Pierre 2004). DeBardeleben 
and Hurrelmann (2007: 240) argue that whilst MLG is likely to increase 
‘output legitimacy’ (the problem-solving capacity of the EU), it is also 
likely to reduce ‘input legitimacy’ (essentially, democratic legitimacy) 
because of increased difficulties in calling leaders to account.   
A study of the activities of English local authorities is particularly 
important because there is already significant knowledge available in 
relation to the so-called ‘constitutional regions’, such as the German 
Länder and the Italian regions, and how the regional parliaments hold 
the offices to account and intervene in determining their agendas 
(Panara 2015, chapter 5; Rowe 2011, chapter 6). There is a gap in the 
literature concerning the democratic legitimacy, accountability and 
transparency of the offices of the local authorities and particularly of the 
English authorities. Some might argue that a comparison between the 
approach of English local authorities and cities in Germany might be 
more appropriate. We believe that given that many offices that we 
examine are created by combined authorities representing city regions, 
by large counties, or are emanations of large cities with a relatively wide 
geographical scope such as Birmingham or Bristol, so they are not 
directly comparable with the German cities.  
 
(v) The impact of the Brexit referendum  
 
Following the result of the recent referendum held in June 2016 
(‘Brexit’), English local authorities will no doubt have to reconsider their 
external engagement with players from outside the UK and will have to 
develop a new strategy concerning their international relations and those 
with the EU. For the time being, until the Brexit negotiations have been 
completed (i.e. at least for the next two or three years depending on 
when Article 50 TEU is triggered by the UK government), Britain remains 
a full member of the EU. At present the status of the UK at the end of the 
negotiations under Article 50 is largely unpredictable. What we know is 
that sub-national authorities from some non-EU countries belonging to 
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the European Economic Area (EEA) operate offices in Brussels. This is 
for example the case of the Norwegian regions and it is principally due to 
the fact that Norway contributes funding to INTERREG, Horizon 2020 
and other programmes. Should the UK after Brexit continue to fund 
these schemes, UK stakeholders would remain eligible for these sources 
of funding. Some or all UK sub-national authorities may therefore decide 
to maintain their offices in Brussels. Also, if and when the UK withdraws 
from the EU, along with the right to vote in the Council, both the UK 
government and certain UK sub-national organisations (the City of 
London, larger cities etc.) might need to lobby the EU in relation to those 
policies which will continue to impact upon the UK (e.g. standards of 
quality of UK products marketed in the EU, public procurement, EU 
workers’ rights in the UK etc.). They are therefore likely to continue to 
need representatives in Brussels to lobby the EU and maintain a link 
between the local community and the EU. 
 
We will demonstrate below that most of the offices examined have the 
securing of EU funding as an important part of their remit. It may be that 
at least some of these offices will be threatened should the UK withdraw 





There is no legislation which directly permits or envisages the creation of 
representative offices, although the legality of their establishment has 
not been challenged in the courts. Since the coming into force of the 
general power of competence contained in section 1 of the Localism Act 
2011, there is no doubt that local authorities in England enjoy the 
competence to create such offices. 
In the absence of a uniform legal framework governing the offices, there 
is considerable variation in the manner in which such offices have been 
created and are operated, in their size, budget allocation and number of 
employees and also in their territorial scope, with some offices 
representing a single local authority (e.g. Cornwall, Bristol) and others 
representing a large number of authorities (e.g. East of England, 
Southern England). Some offices are created and paid for directly by the 
local authority or authorities concerned, perhaps with contributions from 
other organisations with an interest in European policymaking such as 
universities, whereas other local authorities have adopted what might be 
described as a ‘procurement model’, where the services are put out to 
tender and are provided by a commercial provider. 
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English local authorities have a fundamental role in fulfilling many of the 
requirements of EU law (Varney 2013, 353-355; Guderjan 2015). Under 
Part 2 of the Localism Act 2011, local authorities could face shared 
liability with the UK central government should a financial sanction be 
imposed for an infringement of EU law caused by a local authority. Thus, 
authorities have a clear interest in being effectively engaged in 
influencing EU law that might affect them. 
Given the general policy of economic austerity in the UK and the 
particular need for local authorities to reduce their expenditure due to 
reductions in support from the central government of around 40 per cent 
in the period from April 2011 to April 2016 (Independent Commission on 
Local Government Finance 2014, 15), local authorities in some areas of 
England have chosen to reduce or even remove their European 
representation in Brussels. Jeffery’s (1997, 183) survey of local authority 
representation in Brussels counted 29 UK sub-national offices in 
Brussels, 20 of which were English. The need for local authorities to 
reduce costs and the abolition of the Regional Development Agencies 
(RDAs) by the Public Bodies Act 2011 may explain some of the 
closures. Although new Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) have been 
created and were expected to take on many of the functions previously 
fulfilled by RDAs, this has not always been the case, because LEPs do 
not receive central government funding. 
 
The Director of London based company Access Europe Network pointed 
out to us also another possible reason for the closure of Brussels offices. 
This is the smaller importance of a direct link with the EU compared to a 
few years ago. Nowadays a great deal of information concerning EU 
funding is available online and to have someone in loco is no longer 
seen as indispensable. Moreover, within the new financial framework of 
the EU, structural funding is allocated to the national government. Local 
authorities can bid for that funding, but this requires negotiation between 
the UK government and the local authority, not lobbying on the EU level.  
 
(C) Democratic legitimacy and accountability  
 
(i) Consultation of the public 
 
Greater Manchester is the only example of office whose strategy-making 
involved consultation of the public. The priorities of the publicly owned 
company New Economy Manchester, responsible for the Brussels 
Office, are set by the Strategy agreed in 2013 (Greater Manchester 
Combined Authority 2013) and the Brussels services’ lobbying activities 
shall pursue the objectives contained therein. The Strategy was drawn 
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up by the local authorities that constitute Greater Manchester following 
public consultation. Compared to the smaller and more closely defined 
lists of key objectives of other European offices, the lengthy and 
overarching 2013 Strategy of Greater Manchester (77 pages) lacks 
precision on the exact objectives and targets to be pursued on the EU 
level. In the entire document the only reference to the EU is a reference 
to the European Regional Development Fund at page 70. If the Strategy 
is the sole yardstick used to assess the performance of New Economy, it 
could be difficult to assess whether the objectives have been served.  
New Economy is accountable to the local LEP, whose Board includes a 
number of local authority members (Greater Manchester LEP 2016) and 
to a working group comprising of representatives of Greater 
Manchester’s local authorities. The bodies involved in the accountability 
of the company do not normally supplement the Strategy with additional 
instructions for the Brussels based office, because it is felt that the 
guidance provided by that document is adequate. Therefore, New 
Economy seems to enjoy considerable autonomy in developing a more 
detailed European agenda for Greater Manchester. It seems to be an 
‘agent’ rather than a ‘delegate’ of Greater Manchester (Greenwood 
2013, 437). 
 
(ii) The involvement of local councillors in the governance of the 
offices: the ‘democratic deficit’ of the offices 
 
Executive-led offices  
 
Some offices appear executive-led in that they receive more detailed 
guidance from the executive members of a local authority. Here the 
European strategy is normally the result of a dialogue between the office 
and the democratically legitimated executive power. The input can be 
‘top-down’, from the local executive to the office, or ‘bottom-up’, from the 
office to the local executive. This is the case of London’s European 
Office and of Liverpool City Region. In the case of London’s European 
Office, the structure of government in London places significant 
executive powers in the hands of the elected Mayor. As such, much of 
the accountability of the Office and its democratic legitimacy derive from 
the Mayor. The Office’s priorities are decided in London by the Unit of 
Government and EU Relations (top-down). However, the Office itself 
often highlights to the Unit and the Mayor a need for action on the EU 
level (bottom-up). 
The degree of accountability of the London’s European Office is 
comparatively strong. The Unit of Government and EU Relations reports 
directly to the Mayor’s Chief of Staff. It is possible for councillors from the 
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London Boroughs (the local authorities in London) to seek the 
assistance of the Brussels Office, but such requests will usually have to 
be endorsed by the Mayor or the Mayor’s office. The Mayor’s office has 
strong control over the Brussels Office and members of the Brussels 
Office return to London three or four times a month to provide progress 
reports and to receive instructions.  
This kind of oversight and accountability is strong also because the 
Mayor’s office provides the vast majority of the funding for the Brussels 
Office and therefore exerts considerable control and influence. This 
model is important because it may be an indication of what might come 
in the future in other areas. The Cities and Local Government Devolution 
Act 2016 provides in sections 2 – 5 (which insert new sections 107A-
107G of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction 
Act 2009) for the potential for new combined authorities to be led by an 
elected mayor, who would likely enjoy considerable executive powers. 
However, a combined authority will only have an elected mayor if the 
authorities which constitute the combined authority request this model of 
governance under s. 107B of the Local Democracy, Economic 
Development and Construction Act 2009. This model of mayoral 
oversight may be attractive in the sense that it provides direct 
accountability of the office to the major funder, but may bring the 
disadvantage that the office is to some extent distanced from the local 
councillors because the mayor exerts greater influence over the office. 
Prior to the creation of the Combined Authority, the Liverpool City 
Region Office (until 2014 called Merseyside Brussels Office) was 
accountable to its subscribers mainly in an ad hoc manner. The main 
chain of accountability was to senior executive (i.e. non-elected) officers 
of the subscribing local authorities, who used to come together in a 
quarterly forum (Panara 2015, 144 et seq.). The creation in 2014 of the 
Combined Authority has brought about a greater degree of political 
oversight of the Brussels Office’s activities. There is  some evidence that 
the elected members of the Combined Authority (i.e. the leaders of the 
local authorities concerned) are involved in this process. In June 2015, 
for example, the Combined Authority approved a list of priorities 
proposed by the Director of the Liverpool City Region Office in 
consultation with other officials of the Combined Authority and 
stakeholders, to guide its work in the seeking of European funding 
opportunities (Liverpool City Region Combined Authority 2015, item 11). 
Both democratic legitimacy and accountability might be improved if the 
same approach was taken in respect of priorities for lobbying. However, 
caution must be adopted in this regard because given the ad hoc nature 
of some lobbying activity, which arises in response to EU policy 
proposals, the need to seek approval from the Combined Authority to 
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engage in lobbying on a particular issue could significantly hinder the 
lobbying process, as the Combined Authority meets only once a month. 
What we call ‘executive-led’ model has the benefit of focusing some 
democratic scrutiny on the Office, although the scrutiny is carried out 
mainly by the Mayor’s team or by the members of the Combined 
Authority, rather than directly by the local councils or with an active 
contribution of the councillors. A few offices reported that the limited 
involvement of the councillors may also depend on the highly technical 
character of the matters relating to the EU or on the little interest that 
many councillors have in the EU. Certainly neither in the case of London 
nor in that of Liverpool there is evidence of significant two-way 
communication between the Office and the wider local community 
including consultation of the public on the European agenda of the 
Office.   
 
Official-led offices  
 
Both Bristol Brussels Office and Southern England Local Partners 
(SELP) are a ‘hybrid’ in our classification. They feature some elements 
of the ‘executive-led’ model in that the Mayor (Bristol) or members of the 
cabinets (SELP) play an important leadership role in the governance of 
the office. However, more immediate and regular guidance for these 
offices comes from the high level officials within the local authorities. In 
this sense both offices are ‘official-led’, as a sub-type of the ‘executive-
led’ model. 
The general political inspiration for the action of the Bristol Brussels 
Office comes from the Mayor’s document A Vision for Bristol (Ferguson 
2015). However, in this document there is nothing specific on the role 
and activity of the Office and the only references to the EU are to the 
European Green Capital award obtained by Bristol in 2015. A similar 
approach is demonstrated in other documents produced by the Authority 
(Bristol City Council 2015). The actual policy and lobbying priorities for 
the Office are determined by the European and International Service of 
Bristol City Council, a body comprising of Council’s senior bureaucrats. 
In a sense the Brussels Office appears to be a longa manus of that 
department, although the Director of the Office explained that he is in 
regular contact also with elements of local stakeholders such as local 
universities and business organisations, with a view to making the Office 
more responsive to the demands of Bristol’s civil society. The Office is 
accountable to the European International Service and the Council’s 
Senior Leadership Team regularly reviews the activity of the Office. 
Ultimately the Council (i.e. the democratically elected councillors) has 
the power to increase or decrease the funding allocation for the Office or 
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even to ‘unplug the machine’ by suppressing the Office if it is felt that 
this is not delivering adequate results for the city. 
Also the Office of Southern England Local Partners (SELP) is a ‘hybrid’ 
featuring some executive-led elements. However, it would appear that 
the role of local authorities’ officials in the governance of the Office is 
somewhat stronger. This office has the peculiarity that it is subscriber-
based. It is currently supported by 20 partner organisations, only 11 of 
which are territorial authorities. The fundamental steer for the Office 
comes from the Board . The Board comprises of political representatives 
of the authorities on a high level (i.e. members of the local cabinets, 
although this is not the case for West Sussex County Council) and high 
profile people from the other partner organisations (for example, the 
Dean for Research and Innovation from a major University). The Board, 
meeting two or three times a year, determines the general direction of 
the Office and approves its annual work programme. This programme 
also establishes ‘Key Performance Indicators’ (KPIs) for SELP. 
However, more detailed and day-to-day guidance for the Office comes 
from the quarterly meetings of officials from the partner organisations. 
There is no evidence that these officials involve or take instructions from 
councillors of the local authorities.   
 
Examples of stronger involvement of elected councillors and 
stakeholders in the governance of the offices: East of England and 
Cornwall   
 
In the case of the East of England Office, 52 local authorities provide 
most of the Office’s funding via the East of England Local Government 
Association. Given the large number of authorities funding the Office’s 
activities, an accountability model akin to that for London and Liverpool 
City Region would not be viable. The main system of governance and 
accountability for the Office is delivered via the Europe and International 
Panel of the East of England Local Government Association. The panel 
has ten members who are elected councillors, selected for reasons of 
political balance. There are also representatives of the Local Enterprise 
Partnerships (LEPs) which subscribe to the Office, the universities and a 
range of other stakeholders (East of England European Partnership 
2015, 6). The Panel sets the annual priorities for the Office and 
approves the annual business plan, which guides the day-to-day work of 
the Office. The Panel is open to attendance by any councillor from one 
of the councils involved in the Office. Furthermore, the Director of the 
Office has appeared occasionally in the past before Overview and 
Scrutiny Committees of the local authorities. However, relatively few 
councils have sought the Director’s attendance, perhaps because a 
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relatively small number of councillors have an interest in the highly 
technical matters decided by the EU. 
The governance structure of the East of England Office reflects political 
realities. It would be impossible for the Office to be solely accountable to 
local authorities because it is also funded by LEPs (of which, elected 
members of local authorities are board members) and a number of 
universities and other stakeholders, all of which must have a role in the 
governance and determination of the Office’s priorities. Furthermore, any 
governance arrangements must be proportionate to the level of 
resources invested. Given the large number of local authorities involved 
in the financing of the Office, the cost to each individual authority is 
relatively small and may not justify the investment of resources required 
to have more extensive oversight.  
East of England has developed a system of governance and 
accountability which to an extent values the role of the councillors and of 
the councils. The main limitations are: (a) the mixed composition of the 
Office (local authorities, LEPs, universities, other stakeholders), which is 
not limited to democratically legitimated and self-governed local 
authorities and (b) the high number of local authorities involved in the 
Office. The fact that the Office represents as many as 52 local 
authorities puts it in a position to represent a territorial area (‘East of 
England’), rather than a community with a well-defined regional identity 
reflected in institutional arrangements (for example, the Cornwall 
Authority). 
In the case of the Cornwall Brussels Office, the policy and lobbying 
priorities for the activity of the Office are indicated by a strategy 
document approved by the Office’s partners in 2013. This document 
contains a clear indication of KPIs and the Cornwall Brussels 
Representative reports monthly to the funders against these KPIs.  
Local councillors are involved in the accountability of the Office. This is 
accountable to the Economy and Cultural Policy Advisory Committee of 
the Council, which is responsible for EU funding.  
The Office works closely with Cornwall-based officials and teams dealing 
with matters relevant to the EU (in particular, the officials and teams 
responsible for economic development, including EU funding). The 
Cornwall Brussels Representative will liaise with the relevant staff every 
time. Often it is the councillors and the officials who ask the Office to 
lobby on a certain issue (top-down). However, sometimes it is the Office 
that, after becoming aware of some information in Brussels, advises the 
Council to lobby on a certain issue and asks for further instructions 
(bottom-up). 
The Office is accountable not only to the Council but also to the other 
partners: the local LEP and the Cornwall universities. The accountability 
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to the LEP has been channelled principally through the Council, given 
that the LEP is closely aligned to the Council. The Office also reports 
every quarter to the Executive Committee of the Combined Universities 
in Cornwall, which includes representatives from all the local 
universities. Additionally, the Office reports twice a year to a steering 
group comprising of the VCs of all the local universities. 
In summary, the lobbying priorities for the Cornwall Office are selected 
democratically and that the elected councillors are adequately informed 
and involved in the life of the Office. An important role in guiding the 
action of the Office is played by the relevant bureaucracy, i.e. by the 
Council’s senior officials and teams working on matters which are 
relevant to the EU.   
 
(D) A unique link to the EU: The Local Government Association 
Office: A sui generis politically-driven office without a territorial 
community 
 
The LGA Brussels Office is a unique example of liaison and lobbying 
office, in that it does not represent a local community and territory, but 
the entire local government in England and Wales. This office is very 
important also because it is the secretariat of the UK section of the 
Committee of the Regions (hereafter CoR).  
The process for determining the policy priorities of the LGA Brussels 
Office is democratically structured and transparent. Every year in 
autumn the EU Commission presents its programme of work for the 
following year. After examining the programme, the LGA Brussels Office 
formulates a proposal with a list of items drafted having in mind the 
topics which are of direct relevance to the local government. A key role 
in this process is played by the UK section of the CoR which is run by 
the LGA. The UK section of the CoR shall previously discuss and decide 
the list of priorities which the LGA Brussels Office shall then put forward 
to an LGA’s Committee or Board comprised of councillors from English 
and Welsh local authorities. These councillors are chosen by their 
political groups in proportion to the overall number of councillors they 
have across these two countries. This Committee or Board has ultimate 
responsibility for the approval of the LGA’s Annual EU Work Priorities.  
The Office reports regularly on specific items to the various LGA boards 
(also comprised of elected councillors) responsible for a given area: 
social issues, environment, city issues, transport, energy, funding etc. 
Sometimes the Office just reports relevant information, whilst other times 
it submits a paper for discussion in order to receive the point of view of 
democratically elected politicians on a certain topic. The relevant board 
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will usually agree on a detailed LGA’s policy position indicating which 
areas of proposed EU legislation need improving and lobbying. 
What is the added value of the LGA’s Office in comparison with the 
offices of individual ‘regions’ or ‘localities’? The LGA can be a stronger 
player in the lobbying process in that it represents an entire tier of 
government and can form coalitions with similar associations from other 
countries or with the Council of European Municipalities and Regions 
(CEMR).  
                                        
Transparency  
 
Transparency is very important for accountability and communicating the 
EU’s activities to the local level. The East of England Office’s Director 
emphasised the publication of the Business Plan 2015-16, which has 
been endorsed by the Europe and International Panel of the East of 
England Local Government Association. This is published on the Office’s 
website and is therefore available to the public (East of England 
European Partnership 2015). Further positive efforts are made by East 
of England to be transparent and to engage with the public; the website 
is regularly updated with details of the Office’s work, a regular newsletter 
is circulated around a mailing list (where any member organisation can 
sign up) at least fortnightly and there is an active Twitter feed. This 
‘active’ transparency is perhaps driven by the fact that the subscribers to 
the East of England Office are diverse, so an open and transparent 
approach is the most effective way to serve their needs. 
The Office of the Liverpool City Region seeks to be transparent through 
similar methods to the East of England Office – there is a mailing list of 
stakeholders. Furthermore, the Director of the Office seeks to convene a 
forum of stakeholders on a quarterly basis where members and officials 
of the authorities which finance the Office can meet and discuss issues 
pertaining to the Office and its work. There is also a website where 
funding and policy bulletins are published and agendas, reports and 
minutes of forum meetings are also published (Liverpool City Region 
Brussels Office 2016). This provides a good level of public access to 
documents and information about the work of the Office.  
The London European Office arguably has a less transparent system – 
there is a web page with rather little information and there are no regular 
press releases. There is some media engagement where this might be 
useful to the lobbying activities of the Office, an active Twitter feed that 
provides information about its work and a newsletter, though this has 
only a very limited circulation. This model is likely explained by the level 
of control exerted over the activity of the Office by the Mayor’s office – 
the Office is in place primarily to deliver the objectives set for it by the 
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Mayor, with less involvement from the London Boroughs and other 
stakeholders, hence the relative lack of public engagement. 
Other offices are unable to maintain a website due to their smaller size 
in terms of staffing and resources. Bristol (only one member of full-time 
staff) is currently exploring the creation of a website and the launch of a 
Twitter feed, whilst Cornwall (one member of staff working part-time) has 
a webpage and uses Twitter regularly. However, these two offices do not 
provide regular newsletters for stakeholders or for the wider community. 
The Director of SELP pointed out that it is not part of SELP’s mission to 
work directly with citizens. It is up to member organisations, including in 
particular the local authorities, to share the information with the wider 
community as they deem fit and to interface with the local community on 
matters concerning the EU. 
In addition to the positive steps taken by each of the offices to be 
transparent and to make their work known to the public, each of the 
offices will be subject to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 as 
emanations of a local authority, which is a public authority for the 
purposes of section 3 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. It is 
possible that the offices or the local authorities may be able to withhold 
disclosure of the information if any of the exemptions in the Act can be 
relied upon. Any such endeavour to rely on these exemptions would 
then bring about a ‘public interest’ test to determine whether the interest 
in disclosure outweighs the potential prejudice. 
The two public companies involved in this study, New Economy 
Manchester makes considerable endeavours to be transparent – there is 
a website and an active Twitter feed giving information about its work. 
There is also a monthly newsletter (a service that must be paid for) 
which is received by around 200 organisations, including local 
authorities and universities in the area of the Combined Authority. 
Finally, there is an EU bulletin made available to members of the public 
via the website. As such, there is considerable transparency over the 
activities of the company, but one might argue that the transparency of 
the governance of New Economy is relatively weak when compared to 
some of the offices discussed above.  
As publicly owned companies, both New Economy and Access Europe 
Network are likely to fall within the provisions of section 6 of the 
Freedom of Information Act 2000 and thus would be subject to the 
requirements of the Act.  
 
Concluding remarks – The limited contribution of the English local 
authorities to a more democratic MLG in the EU  
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We conclude that the contribution of the English offices to a more 
democratic MLG in the EU, although variable from office to office, is 
limited. A more democratic MLG in the EU requires something more than 
mere participation by the sub-national authorities in EU policymaking 
processes. It is also necessary for local and regional authorities to 
create adequate processes capable of ensuring that their position in 
Brussels is a genuine reflection of democratically selected priorities of 
the territorial community. Despite some exceptions, this is generally not 
the case of the English offices. They tend to develop their agendas 
without significant involvement of the people and of their elected 
representatives. Ultimately, they tend to represent portions of the local 
society, interests of certain stakeholders, rather than the views of the 
broader local community. The reasons for this are many and varied, but 
often include a lack of resources, the fact that the offices are often 
financed by multiple stakeholders and also the fact that office employees 
are treated by law as local government officers and the requirements of 
the Local Government Act 1972 are such that local government officers 
ought not to become involved in political decisions. 
 
Knodt (2011, 420) has argued that territorial interests, such as those 
represented by the offices of English local authorities have a double-
sided role “as legitimated constituencies of democratic systems on the 
one hand and actors within multi-level systems that pursue lobbying on 
the other hand”. This role might be contrasted with functional interests, 
such as those of industry players or similar stakeholders, which seek 
only to advance their own interests primarily through lobbying activity. It 
has been argued that although territorial interests have the advantage of 
the formal political mechanisms such as the Committee of the Regions 
to advance their policy interests, both territorial and functional actors use 
a wide array of techniques, including lobbying and participation in policy 
networks to influence the EU policymaking process (Knodt 2011; 
Trobbiani 2016). The evidence that we have accumulated suggests that 
the English offices may well be a good example of territorial interests (in 
the form of local authorities) coming together with functional interests 
(such as the stakeholders who are often involved in financing and 
influencing the policy priorities of the offices) to represent their collective 
interests. It may be that the comparatively weak constitutional position of 
English local authorities and the limited resources that they enjoy have 
in some respects limited the democratic input into the priorities of each 
office, but has encouraged the interpenetration of territorial and 
functional interests in a way that is developing more slowly in other EU 
Member States (Trobbiani 2016). It may well be that Brexit, combined 
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with the need for continued cost savings in the current context of 




Allen, David. 2010. “The Structural Funds and Cohesion Policy” in Policy-Making in the 
European Union edited by Helen Wallace, Mark Pollack and Alasdair R. Young, 229-252. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Benz, Arthur. 2010. “The European Union as a loosely coupled multi-level system” in 
Handbook on Multi-level Governance edited by Henrik Enderlein, Sonja Wälti and Michael 
Zürn, 214-226. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: 2010. 
Bristol City Council. 2015. Our Resilient Future: A Framework for Climate and Energy 
Security Bristol: Bristol City Council. 
http://www.bristol.gov.uk/documents/20182/33423/Our+Resilient+Future+A+Framework+for
+Climate+and+Energy+Security/2ee3fe3d-efa5-425a-b271-14dca33517e6. Accessed 
November 2016.  
Burch, Martin and Ricardo Gomez. 2002. “The English Regions and the European Union” 
Regional Studies 36: 767-778. 
Committee of the Regions. 2009. White Paper on Multilevel Governance, CdR 89/2009, 17-
18 June 2009. 
Cygan, Adam. 2013. “Regional Governance, Subsidiarity and Accountability within the EU’s 
Multi-Level Polity” European Public Law 19: 161-188. 
DeBardeleben, Joan and Achim Hurrelmann. 2007. “Conclusion” in Democratic Dilemmas of 
Multilevel Governance edited by Joan DeBardeleben and Achim Hurrelmann, 240-243. New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan.  
East of England European Partnership. 2015. East of England European Partnership 
Business Plan 2015 – 2016. Brussels: East of England European Partnership. 
http://www.east-of-england.eu/documents/business%20plan/15-03-
26_european_partnership_business_plan_2015-16_v4_final.pdf. Accessed November 2016. 
EU Commission. 2001. European Governance – A White Paper, COM (2001) 428, 25 July 
2001. 
European Parliament. 2003. Resolution on the role of regional and local authorities in 
European integration, 14 January 2003, 2002/2141(INI). 
Ferguson, George. 2015. A Vision for Bristol. Bristol: Mayor of Bristol. 
http://www.bristol.gov.uk/documents/20182/34880/vision-full-document-18-11-
2013.pdf/485d6b4c-86e0-41e5-8f3e-70bdedfa5c46. Accessed November 2016. 
Greater Manchester Combined Authority. 2013. Stronger Together: Greater Manchester 
Strategy Manchester: Greater Manchester Combined Authority. 
http://www.greatermanchester-ca.gov.uk/downloads/file/8/stronger_together_-
_greater_manchester_strategy. Accessed November 2016. 
Greater Manchester LEP. 2016. “About the Board”. http://www.gmlep.com/about/the-board/. 
Accessed November 2016.    
Greenwood, Justin. 2011. “Actors of the Common Interest? The Brussels Offices of the 
Regions” Journal of European Integration 33: 437-451 
Greenwood, Justin. 2014. “The regional offices in Brussels. From ‘push and pull’ to ‘people 
and place’” Regions and Cohesion 4(3): 1-16. 
Guderjan, Marius. 2015. “Theorising European Integration of Local Government – Insights 
from the Fusion Approach” Local Government Studies 41: 937-955. 
Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks. 2001. Multi-Level Governance and European Integration. 
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Independent Commission on Local Government Finance. 2014. Financing English 
Devolution London: Independent Commission on Local Government Finance. 
  20 
Jeffery, Charlie. 1997. “Regional Information Offices in Brussels and Multi-Level Governance 
in the EU: A UK-German Comparison” in The Regional Dimension of the European Union 
edited by Charlie Jeffery, 183-203. London: Frank Cass. 
John, Peter. 1994. “UK Sub-national Offices in Brussels: Diversification or Regionalisation?” 
Regional Studies 28: 739-759. 
John, Peter. 1997. “Europeanization in a Centralising State: Multi-Level Governance in the 
UK” in The Regional Dimension of the European Union edited by Charlie Jeffery, 131-145. 
London: Frank Cass. 
Knodt, Michèle. 2011. “Strategies of Territorial and Functional Interests: Towards a Model of 
European Interest Intermediation?” Journal of European Integration, 33: 419-435 
Liverpool City Region Brussels Office. 2016. “Forum Meeting Papers”. 
http://www.lcrbrussels.eu/pageinfo.asp?Forum-Meeting-Papers-i16.html. Accessed 
November 2016. 
Liverpool City Region Combined Authority. 2015. “Minutes of Meeting, 19 June 2015”. 
http://councillors.knowsley.gov.uk/ieListDocuments.aspx?CId=890&MId=6358&Ver=4&Style
Type=standard&StyleSize=none. Accessed November 2016. 
Macneill, Stewart, Charlie Jeffery and John Gibney. 2007. “Changing Dynamics of Regional 
Representation in Brussels: A Case Study of Birmingham and the West Midlands” Regional 
Studies 41: 403-414. 
Mangiameli, Stelio. 2006. “The Role of Regional and Local Government in European 
Governance” in Governing Europe under a Constitution edited by Hermann-Josef Blanke 
and Stelio Mangiameli, 457-482. Berlin: Springer. 
Marks, Gary, Liesbet Hooghe and Kermit Blank. 1996. “European Integration from the 
1980s: State-centric v. Multi-level Governance” Journal of Common Market Studies 34: 341-
78. 
Panara, Carlo. 2015. The Sub-national Dimension of the EU: A Legal Study of Multilevel 
Governance Berlin: Springer. 
Panara, Carlo. 2016. “The Contribution of Local and Regional Authorities to a ‘Good’ System 
of Governance within the EU” Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 23: 
forthcoming. 
Pernice, Ingolf. 2002. “Multilevel Constitutionalism in the European Union”: Walter Hallstein-
Institut Paper 5. http://www.whi-berlin.de/documents/whi-paper0502.pdf. Accessed August 
2016.   
Peters, B. Guy and Jon Pierre. 2004. “Multi-level Governance and Democracy: A Faustian 
Bargain?” in Multi-level Governance edited by Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders, 75-90. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Piattoni, Simona. 2009. The Theory of Multi-level Governance. Conceptual, Empirical and 
Normative Challenges. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Rowe, Caroline. 2011. Regional Representations in the EU: Between Diplomacy and Interest 
Mediation. New York, Palgrave-MacMillan. 
Sykes, Oliver and Alexander Lord. 2011. “Whither a Europe of the (English) regions? 
Reflections on the prospects for the representation of the English territorial interests in 
Europe” Local Economy 26: 486-499. 
Trobbiani, Riccardo. 2016. “European Regions in Brussels: Towards Functional Interest 
Representation?” Bruges Political Research Papers No. 53. 
https://www.coleurope.eu/system/files_force/research-
paper/wp53_trobbiani.pdf?download=1. Accessed November 2016. 
Varney, Mike. 2013. “Local Government in England: Localism Delivered?” in Local 
Government in Europe: The ‘Fourth Level’ in the EU Multilayered System of Governance 
edited by Carlo Panara and Mike Varney, 330-369. London: Routledge. 

 Reader in EU Law and Comparative Public Law, Liverpool John Moores University, UK.  
 Senior Lecturer in Law and Deputy Director of the Institute of European Public Law, The 
University of Hull, UK.  
                                                          
  21 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
 
